When insurance changes behavior—and someone else pays the price.
Moral hazard occurs when one party changes their behavior after a deal is made because they do not bear the full consequences of their actions. The classic setting is insurance: once insured, a person takes fewer precautions because the cost of loss falls largely on the insurer. It arises whenever someone is shielded from risk.
Before the deal: An uninsured homeowner installs a security system and checks for fire hazards. The full cost of loss is theirs, so they take care.
After the deal: Once fully insured, the incentive to maintain security weakens. The insurer bears most of the loss—so the homeowner is less careful. That shift in behavior is moral hazard.
Asymmetric information: The insured party knows their own behavior; the insurer cannot observe it directly. This information gap is what makes moral hazard hard to eliminate.
Health insurance: Insured patients may visit doctors more often or choose costlier treatments because they pay only a copay—the insurer covers the rest.
Bank bailouts: Banks that expect to be rescued by the government take larger risks. The implicit guarantee shifts potential losses to taxpayers.
Corporate expense accounts: Employees spending company money have less incentive to economize than when spending their own.
Deductibles and copays: Making the insured party pay part of every claim keeps skin in the game and reduces careless behavior.
Monitoring and audits: Insurers and employers observe behavior—driving telematics, expense receipts—to catch and deter excessive risk-taking.
Contractual incentives: Performance bonuses, clawback clauses, and aligned compensation structures reduce the gap between private and social costs.
Screening and selection: Offering different policy tiers forces agents to self-select, revealing their true risk level.